The 2012 Prez results: as Caucagüita votes, so does the country

Enough of you seem to have forgiven me. And so let's get started with the Sunday results. And what better place than to start with Caucagüita which has been a long running monitor in this blog, the latest entry being when I started getting ready for the 2012 speculations.  Not only it will serve as the best way to understand what happened last Sunday but it will also serve as a detailed explanation while so many people got it all wrong last Sunday. We will start with a summary table.

The CNE is accused of a lot of things so for once I decided to go back on my data to include even the null votes.  And it is interesting even if it does not give a smoking gun to blame the CNE for the evils that we, the  opposition, suffer.

First, it is worhty of notice that for the two referenda that have been the more decried elections in Venezuela, 2004 and 2007, we do not get full data as to participation  roll call, etc.  That data may exist somewhere but it is not in the CNE page open to the public. If the CNE wanted to promote conspiracy theories it would not proceed any differently.  The first three rows I made a graph for them below so I will discuss them there.  Let's look at the bottom of the table.

Registered voters. It is notable how the roll grew between 2006 and 2008. and yet, it keeps varying up and down at an appreciable level since. We are talking here a 10% range.  Do that many people die and move in Caucagüita in these 4 last years? Do we have refugees settlements there? Why was there such an increase in 2004-2008?

Abstention. This is the whole story. The chavista machine this time around got its act together and managed to increase the chavista vote by almost 6,000.  2K of these coming from recent moving in the county, by the way.

Null vote. Capriles yesterday said that he did not win Miranda outright in part because of the high null vote. Well, it is not particularly higher in Caucagüita, the second highest only so he may want to look for another excuse. However we also see that in 2004 NO ONE made a mistake, but since then a significant retard population seem to have moved in to Caucagüita. And then the CNE would like me to believe that the 2004 result was clean? Gimme a break!

And there I revisit the graph posted August 14, adding Sunday's result.  It is striking of course  But yet not without its gray areas for chavismo.

The opposition numbers. They keep increasing though at a slower pace. It is possible that indeed Caucagüita was not as happy with their governor as he would like us to think. I am eagerly waiting the results of December.

Vote ratio. In spite of all its electoral machinery, and probably voting rolls not as kosher as they should be, the vote ratio in favor of chavismo does quite not recover and it still was higher in three past elections. In fact, if we compare 2006 at 2.7 votes for every Rosales vote, at 1,7 Chavez vote this time for every Capriles vote means a long term bad sign for chavismo.

Conclusion: this is what happened all over the country  The opposition kept going up but Chavez machinery allowed him to recover his folks, though not making that many new friends besides the natural population increase of his flock. Considering how ill managed the country is, no one could expect such a successful get the vote operation.

PS: for details on the social make up of Caucagüita, as to its importance, please, refer to older posts, I cannot keep repeating myself over and over.

PS2: note that in 2004, 2008 and 2010 there was more than one set of data to pick from. I chose those which I think are the most representative of Chavez direct effect. Still, no matter what set, the trend remains.